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STEMMING THE HOBBYLOBBY TIDAL WAVE:
WHY RFRA CHALLENGES TO OBAMA'S

EXECUTIVE ORDER
PROHIBITING FEDERAL CONTRACTORS FROM
DISCRIMINATING AGAINST LGBT EMPLOYEES
WILL NOT SUCCEED
Kayla A. Higgins

INTRODUCTION

Just one day after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, holding that a religious employer could not be
required to provide employees with certain types of contraception,' a group
of faith leaders attempted to capitalize on that judicial victory by sending a
letter to the White House arguing that the administration should show more
deference to the interests of religious organizations.2 The letter urged
President Obama to "include a religious exemption in [his] planned
executive order addressing federal contractors and LGBT employment
policies." 3 The letter's signers argued that "[a] religious exemption in [his]
executive order on LGBT employment rights would allow for . ..[the]
balancing [of] the government's interest in protecting both LGBT
Americans, as well as the religious organizations that seek to serve in
accordance with their faith and values."4 The letter was a strategic political
move in the wake of the Hobby Lobby ruling, which "left open the question

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
2 Molly Ball, Hobby Lobby is Already Creating New Religious Demands on Obama, THE

ATLANTIC

(Jul. 2, 2014), http://theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/hobby-lobby-is-

already-creating-new-religious-demands-on-obama/373853/.
3Email from Dr. Joel C. Hunter et. al., Senior Pastor, Northland, A Church Distributed, to
President Barack Obama (July 1, 2014) (on file with Rainbow Blades, 6 The Gay Grassroots
Newsletter 7 (2014)), http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1211993/letter-to-obamafrom-faith-leaders.pdf.
4
1d
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of whether certain corporations can challenge other legal requirements
based on religious opposition."5
Notably, the signers of the letter were not just right-wing religious
leaders and CEOs of conservative Christian and Catholic organizations.
Signers included faith leaders who have been generally friendly to the
administration, including Michael Wear, who worked for the Obama
administration and was the director of faith outreach for Obama's 2012
presidential campaign, as well as "two members of Catholics for Obama
and three former members of the President's Advisory Council on FaithBased and Neighborhood Partnerships."6
Despite the appeals from these religious leaders, President Obama
issued his executive order without providing a religious exemption.7 On
July 21, 2014, President Obama released Executive Order 13672, entitled
"Further Amendments to Executive Order 11478, Equal Employment
Opportunity in the Federal Government, and Executive Order 11246, Equal
Employment Opportunity."8 The express purpose of the order was to
"provide for a uniform policy for the Federal Government to prohibit
discrimination and take further steps to promote economy and efficiency in
Federal Government procurement by prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity." The Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) then issued the final rule implementing
Executive Order 13672 on December 9, 2014, which stated the regulations
would become effective starting April 8, 2015.' ° The OFCCP issued the
Rule "without notice or an opportunity for public comment[J"
which
makes it difficult to predict what kind of compliance issues might arise.

5 Chris Opfer, Obama Issues OrderBanning LGBT Bias, Declines Call to Expand Religious
Exemption, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 24, 2014), http://www.bna.com/obama-issues-ordern17179892851/.
6 Ball, supra note 2.
7 Opfer, supra note 5. President Obama's order, however, still left in place the "ministerial
exception to make hiring, firing and other employment decisions related to clergy members"
that was created by President George W. Bush via executive order in 2002. Id. On the other
hand, "Stephen Schneck, the director of Catholic University's Institute for Policy Research
& Catholic Studies, told Bloomberg BNA via e-mail July 21" that "the extent of those
exemptions as they apply to the new order may very well be tested in court." Id.
8 Exec. Order No. 13672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42971 (July 21, 2014).
9
1d.
10 Implementation of Exec. Order No. 13672 Prohibiting Discrimination Based on Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity by Contractors and Subcontractors, 79 Fed. Reg. 72985
(Dec. 9, 2014) (codified as amended at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60).
11 Id. The OFCCP explained this decision by stating that it was relying on the "good cause
exemption[,]" which "allows the agency to dispense with notice and comment when
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Some commentators believe that the order "could be the next
battleground" for the competing views of religious leaders and liberals
when it comes to how to weigh religious liberty against other priorities.12
However, there are two main reasons why the most recent executive
order- when faced with legal challenges regarding its lack of religious
exemption in violation of the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act-will
not crumble under the Hobby Lobby ruling.13
First, the order only extends to federal contractors, who are legally
subject to more control by the federal government than businesses that do
not contract with the federal government. The courts allow the federal
government extra control over federal contractors because of legal
precedent allowing the government deference in managing its internal
affairs. Therefore, it can be argued that RFRA does not apply to the
executive order because RFRA does not change the ability of government
to manage its own internal affairs.
Second, even if the courts find that RFRA does apply and that the
President's executive order must be subject to a RFRA analysis, it would
still survive such an analysis. The order would satisfy RFRA because
merely preventing access to an unnecessary benefit like the ability to
contract with the federal government does not constitute a "substantial
burden" on those contractors who would prefer to continue to discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity for religious reasons.
And even if the courts were to find this limitation on access to federal
contracts to be a "substantial burden," the government would still be able to
show a compelling interest in not subsidizing the unequal treatment of
LGBT people in employment contexts.
Before exploring these arguments, however, this article begins with
a brief overview of the historical context of Executive Order 13672 and
contrasts its scope with that of the proposed federal Employment NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA).
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER

13672

The executive order announced by President Obama on July 21,
2014 pertains to all federal contractors and therefore, "affects 24,000

'impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."' Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. §
553(b)(B). It further explained that it was unnecessary in this case to provide a notice and
comment period because "[n]otice and comment are unnecessary when changes to
regulations merely restate the changes in the enabling authority they implement." Id.
12Ball, supra note 2.
13Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2015).
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companies employing nearly one-fifth of the U.S. workforce."14 The order
adds protection against employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity to a previous executive order from 1969.15
Specifically, it adds "sexual orientation" and "gender identity" as protected
characteristics under Executive Order No. 11246's requirement that "all
Government contracting agencies shall include in every Government
contract [that] . . . [t]he contractor will not discriminate against any
employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or
national origin."' 16 The order also requires that any bidder, prospective
contractor, or subcontractor submit a statement in writing with supporting
information "to the effect that the signer's practices and policies do not
discriminate on the grounds of' these characteristics and that the signer
"consents and agrees that recruitment, employment, and the terms and
conditions of employment under the proposed contract shall be in
accordance with the purposes and provisions of the order."17 President
Obama's order also added "gender identity" as a protected characteristic
under Executive Order No. 11478's requirement that the Government of the
United States "provide equal opportunity in Federal employment" for all
persons and "prohibit discrimination in employment because of race, color,
18
religion, sex," national origin, handicap, age, or sexual orientation.
The order provides much-needed civil discrimination protection for
people who openly identify as LGBT, as it is still the case that in 29 states
workers can "be legally fired or harassed for being gay, lesbian or

14 Shadee Ashtari, Most Americans Don't Think Churches Should Be Exempt From LGBT
Non-Discrimination Laws,

THE

HUFFNGTON

POST

(Oct.

31,

2014,

2:55

PM),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/31 /Igbt-employment-discriminationchurches n 6082846.html.
15 Opfer, supra note 5. The order as it impacts federal contractors "is expected to go into
effect in early 2015, after the Labor Department's Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs issues implementing regulations. The ban on gender identity bias by federal
agencies[,]" however, "is effective immediately." Id.
16 Exec. Order 13672, supra note 8, at 42971 (1967 amendment to the 1965 order adding
"sex" to the list of protected characteristics). See Exec. Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319
(Sept. 24, 1965) (codified as amended at 3 C.F.R. pt. 339).
17Exec. Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965) (as codified as amended at 3
C.F.R. pt. 339).
18 Exec. Order 13672, supra note 8, at 42971; Exec. Order 11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (Aug.
8, 1969) (codified as amended at 3 C.F.R. pt. 803). See also Mathew S. Nosanchuk, The
EnduranceTest: Executive Power and the Civil Rights ofLGBT Americans, 5 ALB. GOV'T L.
REV. 440, 453 (2012).
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bisexual."' 9 Employees also can be legally fired or harassed for being
transgender in 32 states.20
The order builds upon strides made during the Clinton
administration to remove barriers to federal service by gay men and
lesbians. Most directly, it builds upon President Clinton's amendment to
Executive Order 11478 that added sexual orientation as a protected
category.21 In addition, it builds upon an even larger barrier to federal
employment faced by LGBT people that President Clinton removed in
1995. That year, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12968,22 which
removed "the longstanding bar on granting homosexuals access to
classified information," based on the presumption "that their sexual
orientation rendered them vulnerable to being blackmailed" or intimidated
by foreign powers because they "lived closeted lives. 23 It was "a move
long sought by gay rights groups[J" and was called by Elizabeth Birch, the
Executive Director of the Human Rights Campaign Fund, "an important
step toward ending governmentally sanctioned job-discrimination against
gay and lesbian people. 24
But the move was still criticized by conservative groups. An
analyst for the Family Research Council, Robert Maginnis, issued a
statement at the time saying homosexuality should justifiably raise a red
flag in security clearances "because in all healthy societies, homosexuality
is recognized as a pathology with very serious implications for a person's
behavior" and "is a behavior that is associated with a lot of anti-security
markers such as drug and alcohol abuse, promiscuity and violence. '"25
These prior justifications for denying LGBT individuals access to
federal jobs shows how far the gay rights movement has come in just
twenty years. From being openly considered a pathology and a basis for
denying people federal employment, same-sex marriage is now legal
nationwide as a result of the Supreme Court's June 2015 decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges.2 6 However, discrimination against LGBT people in
19 Ashtari, supra note 14; Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information-Map,

AMERiCAN CivIL LIBERTIES UNION,

https://www.aclu.org/maps/non-discrimination-laws-

state-state-information-map (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
20

Id.

21 Nosanchuk, supranote 18, at 453.
22 Exec. Order No. 12968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40245 (Aug. 7, 1995).
23 Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Ends Ban on Security Clearancefor Gay Workers, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/05/us/clinton-ends-ban-on-securityclearance-for-gay-workers.html; see also Nosanchuk, supra note 18, at 452-53.
24
Purdun, supranote 23.
25 Id.
26 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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the workforce is still a common occurrence, and it is something that many
gay rights groups have tried to address through legislation, such as the
federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA).
Interestingly, the lack of a religious exemption in Executive Order
13672 took the reach of the order further than ENDA, 27 which passed the
Senate in 2013 but died at the end of the last Congress.28 ENDA includes a
religious exemption, expressly exempting "a broad array of faith-based
organizations, from churches to religious-service groups to religious
newspapers, meaning those groups could still decline to hire gay or
transgender people if they believe it conflicts with their faith. ' 29 The
broader reach of the President's executive order, at least as applied to
federal contractors, is why some commentators believe that the order
"could be the next battleground. .. " for the competing views of religious
leaders and liberals when it comes to how to weigh religious rights against
other priorities. 0 Other commentators have even more explicitly posited
that Executive Order 13672's lack of a religious exemption for religiously
affiliated federal contractors "may result in a test of the reach of the
' 31
Supreme Court's 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc."
However, there are several reasons why Executive Order 13672
should not crumble under the Hobby Lobby holding when faced with the
likely challenges claiming that the order's lack of a religious exemption is a
violation of RFRA.3 2 First, the order's scope is limited to federal
contractors, who are subject to more control by the federal government than
businesses who do not receive funding from the federal government. This
has already been established by previous legislation such as Title VI of
1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 3 prohibiting racial discrimination by private groups
that get federal funding, and by Title IX of the Education Amendments of
27 See S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6(a) (2013).
28 Chris Johnson, House Panel Rejects Last-Ditch Effort to Pass ENDA, WASH. BLADE
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/12/03/house-panel-rejects-last-ditchpanel-pass-enda/; S.815 - Employment Non-DiscriminationAct of 2013, CoNGREss.Gov,
https://www.congress.govibill/113th-congress/senate-billI815 (last visited Mar. 1, 2015)
(showing that the bill passed the Senate on November 7, 2013).
29 Ball, supra note 2.
30 Id.

31Jill Pedigo Hall, Will Religiously Based FederalContractors Challenge OFCCP'sNew
LGBT
Regulations?,
NAT'L
L.
REv.
(Jan.
28,
2015),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/will-religiously-based-federal-contractors-challengeofccp-s-new-lgbt-regulations.
32
See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2015).
33 Prohibition Against Exclusion From Participation in, Denial of Benefits of, and
Discrimination Under Federally Assisted Programs on Ground of Race, Color, or National
Origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
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1972, prohibiting discrimination based on sex by such groups. 34

In

addition, the legislative history of RFRA itself recognizes that "government
actions involving only management of internal Government affairs or the
use of the Government's own property or resources" do not have to meet
the compelling interest test set forth in the act.35
Second, it is likely courts would hold RFRA does not apply in a
situation where the "substantial burden" allegedly being imposed on
religious expression is the inability to contract with the federal government.
RFRA is likely not to apply in such a case because the Act is meant to
prevent the government from inflicting penalties on parties for religious
expression and should not apply where the only burden is the lack of access
to a government-provided benefit.
Finally, even if the courts do decide that the order would constitute
a substantial burden under RFRA, the government would likely have a
compelling interest in enforcing the order under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Importantly, it is not necessary for
the courts to determine that LGBT people constitute a "suspect class"
triggering strict scrutiny analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment for the
government's interest in promoting non-discrimination against LGBT
people to be considered "compelling." The government can argue it has a
non-constitutional compelling interest in promoting equality in the
workplace. Nevertheless, the expansion of Fifth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment protections to sexual orientation in recent gay
rights cases36 and the aggressive application of the rational basis doctrine by
the Court in such cases suggest that a heightened scrutiny standard does
exist for sexual orientation discrimination.
Moreover, recent polls show that about two-thirds of Americans
support federal legislation that would bar employers from discriminating
against workers on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, and
37
fifty-five percent reject exemptions for any employers-even churches.
This social support for anti-discrimination measures protecting LGBT
workers is likely to impact courts' analyses of the government's compelling
34 Discrimination Based on Sex or Blindness, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
35 S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898 ("[P]re-

Smith case law makes it clear that strict scrutiny does not apply[.]").
36 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,
401 (Cal. 2008), supersededby constitutionalamendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (2008).
17 Most Americans Say Employers Should Never Discriminate,Even on Religious Grounds,
According to Latest Harris/Out& Equal Poll, HARPS POLL (Oct. 30, 2014, 12:00AM),

http://media~theharrispoll.com/documents/FNAL 2014 Out EqualWorkplace Survey Re
lease_ 10.30.2014.pdf
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interest in promoting non-discrimination against LGBT workers. Indeed,
history shows that presidents have often played "a central role in the
advancement of civil rights" by using their executive power to "nudge[] the
federal government closer towards the goal of greater" social equality at
times when it was extremely difficult, for political rather than social
reasons, to move civil rights legislation through Congress.3 8
II. RFRA DOES NOT CHANGE THE ABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO
MANAGE ITS OWN INTERNAL AFFAIRS

To begin, one thing setting apart President Obama's recent
executive order from legislation such as the Affordable Care Act (ACA)the legislation challenged by the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby39 -is that the
order's limitations only extend to employers who contract with the federal
government.4" The ACA, on the other hand, extends to all "employers with
50 or more full-time employees" that do not fall under one of the Act's
exceptions.4 1 This is an important distinction because it means that the
reach of President Obama's order is much more limited than the reach of
the ACA. It only applies to those employers that are directly paid by the
federal government. This limits the order to only protecting the federal
government's interest in not itself underwriting discrimination based on
sexual orientation or gender identity.
The fact that the executive order deals only with how the federal
government would like to conduct its own financial dealings and labor
contracts puts it squarely in the arena of case law dealing with the federal
government's management of its own internal affairs. The Senate Report
accompanying RFRA highlights two landmark decisions by the Supreme
Court demonstrating how pre-Smith case law "makes it clear that strict
scrutiny does not apply to government actions involving only management
of internal Government affairs or the use of the Government's own property
'
or resources."42
The two cases the Senate Report references to support this
assertion are Bowen v. Roy and Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective
Association.4 3
38 Nosanchuk, supra note 18, at 441 (providing examples such as President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's executive order prohibiting racial discrimination in the defense industry and
President Harry S. Truman's executive order ending racial segregation in the U.S. military
before Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
39

Burwell, 134 S.Ct. at 2762.
oSee Exec. Order No. 13672, supra note 8, at 42972.
41 Burwell, 134 S.Ct. at 2762.
,42 S.REP. No.103-111, at 9 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898.
43

1d. at9n. 19.
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In Bowen, the Court decided that a federal statute requiring states to
use a Social Security number in administering the federal Food Stamp and
"Aid to Families with Dependent Children" programs did not burden the
free exercise rights of Native Americans. They believed obtaining a Social
Security number for their 2-year-old daughter would violate their religious
beliefs.' Even more broadly, the Court held that "[t]he Free Exercise
Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental
compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of
the Government's internal procedures." 5
Similarly, in Lyng, the Court held that Native Americans' free
exercise rights were not burdened when the United States Forest Service
constructed mining or timber roads over public lands that were sacred to the
Native American religion, and thus, the compelling interest test was not
triggered.46 The Court explained that its holdings in Lyng and Bowen were
consistent with the Free Exercise Clause because in both cases the affected
individuals were not "coerced by the Government's action into violating
their religious beliefs...,,"'
The situation resulting from Obama's executive order is very
similar. The order is the federal government's way of dictating its own
standards for what constitutes acceptable labor practices for the contractors
it employs. One counter-argument that challengers to the executive order
might make is that the government's contracts with outside businesses and
organizations are not "internal affairs" because they constitute an
interaction between the government and the private sector. However,
Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that the federal government's
dealings with federal contractors constitute the "management of internal
government affairs."
For example, in NASA v. Nelson, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of an initiative extending background checks required for
many government jobs to contract employees.4 8 The Court rejected the
argument that because the Respondents were contract employees and not
civil servants that the "[g]overnment's broad authority in managing its
affairs should apply with diminished force., 49 The Court held, rather, that
the "[g]overnment's interest as a 'proprietor' in managing its operations...
44

Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695, 711-12 (1986). More specifically, the parents believed
that the use of a numerical identifier would "'rob the spirit' of [their] daughter and prevent
her from attaining greater spiritual power." Id. at 696.
45

1d. at 700.

46 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447 (1988).
47
ld. at 449.
4

NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 150 (2011).

49 Id.
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does not turn on such formalities."50 In other words, the government's
authority in managing its affairs applies equally to its management of its
own employees and its management of contract employees.
In addition, various federal circuit courts have upheld the validity
of executive orders dealing specifically with the imposition of labor
regulations only extending to federal contractors. 5 They have upheld these
other executive orders using similar reasoning to the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Bowen and Lyng: that the federal government is entitled to
manage its internal affairs and spend its limited financial resources in the
way it views as most efficient.52
For example, in ContractorsAssociation of East Pennsylvania. v.
Secretary of Labor, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Philadelphia Plan53 was a "valid Executive action designed to remedy the
perceived evil that minority tradesmen have not been included in the labor
pool available for the performance of construction projects in which the
federal government has a cost and performance interest."54 In other words,
the affirmative action plan was justified on the basis that it served the
government's fiscal interest in getting the best labor performance for the
lowest cost. The court also emphasized that in this case, as well as in
previously decided cases dealing with challenges to similar types of
executive orders, the President was not attempting "to impose [his] notions
of desirable social legislation on the states wholesale," but rather was acting
"in the one area in which discrimination in employment was most likely to
affect the cost and the progress of projects in which the federal government
had both financial 'and completion interests." " The court then went on to
hold that "the federal government has a vital interest in assuring that the
largest possible pool of qualified manpower be available for the
accomplishment of its projects. 56
50Jd.

" See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971);
Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
52
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699; Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448.
53 The Philadelphia Plan was a plan promulgated under the authority of Executive Order No.
11246 (one of the two orders amended by President Obama in July 2014 to include language
about sexual orientation and gender identity) that required "bidders on any federal or
federally assisted construction contracts for projects in a five-county area around
Philadelphia . . . [to] submit an acceptable affirmative action program which includes
specific goals for the utilization of minority manpower in six skilled crafts: ironworkers,
plumbers and pipefitters, steamfitters, sheetmetal workers, electrical workers, and elevator
construction workers." ContractorsAss 'n ofE. Pa., 442 F.2d at 163.
54 Id. at 177.
55 Id. at 171.
56 Id.
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Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals earlier held in Farkas
v. Texas Instrument,Inc. that the antidiscrimination provisions of Executive
Order No. 10925, which prohibited federal contractors from discriminating
on the basis of race, creed, color or natural origin, had "the force and effect
of law" because "Congress ha[d] committed to the President broad
authority to prescribe [the] policies and directions" necessary to effectuate
the "procurement of property and services for the government. ' 57 Since the
order's antidiscrimination measures were cognizably related to the
establishment of "an economical and efficient system" for obtaining
property and services for the government, it was a valid exercise of
presidential authority.58 We see again from this case that the courts view the
federal government's interest in being able to spend its financial resources
efficiently and get the best labor available as sound justification for using
whatever policies and directions deemed necessary for those purposes. The
same interest lies behind President Obama's Executive Order 13672.
Antidiscrimination measures that prohibit federal contractors from
discriminating against LGBT employees promote hiring practices that will
encourage the hiring of the best and most qualified employees to do the
work, rather than excluding a particular class of people for prejudicial,
rather than economic, reasons.
111. EVEN IF THE COURTS FIND THAT RFRA DOES APPLY TO THE
PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE ORDER, IT WOULD STILL SURVIVE
STRICT SCRUTINY

A. There is No "Burden" When the LegislationMerely Limits
Access to an UnnecessaryBenefit
Under RFRA, "only governmental actions that place a substantial
burden on the exercise of religion must meet the compelling interest test set
forth in the act."59 Therefore, the presence or lack of a "substantial burden"
is the essential first step to determining whether Executive Order 13672 is
even the kind of governmental action that RFRA applies to.
The classic situation that RFRA was designed to address is one in
which the government passes a law that, through some sort of criminal or
financial penalty, compels a person to act in violation of his or her religious
beliefs.6 ° Executive Order 13672 is clearly not such a law. However,
RFRA's reach has expanded beyond laws that are explicitly punitive. To
57 Farkas, 375 F.2d at 632 n. 1.
58

Id.

59

S.REP. No. 103-111, at 9 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898.

60 S. REP. No. 103-111, at5, 8 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1894, 1897.
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understand what types of free exercise burdens RFRA is meant to address,
it is important to consider what legal developments led Congress to pass the
Act in the first place.
The history of cases leading up to the passage of RFRA most
sensibly begins with the Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner.
The case was brought by a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church
who was fired from her job after she refused to work on Saturday, the
Sabbath Day of her faith, and then she was denied unemployment
compensation benefits by the state of South Carolina because it found her
religious justification for not working on Saturday unacceptable.6 1 The
Court ultimately held that South Carolina was not permitted under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment "to constrain a worker to abandon
his [or her] religious convictions respecting the day of rest." 62 More
generally, the Court held that the government could not substantially
burden an individual's religious practice except where necessary to promote
a compelling interest.63
During the 1980's, however, the Court increasingly began to cut
back on this protection for religious freedoms, culminating in the Court's
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, which essentially overruled Sherbert.64 In Smith, the Court
held that the State of Oregon did not violate the Free Exercise Clause by
denying unemployment benefits to workers fired for using illegal drugs for
religious purposes.65 The plaintiffs in Smith were two Native Americans
who were fired for ingesting sacramental peyote and were then denied
unemployment compensation "because they had been discharged for workrelated misconduct." Essentially negating the holding in Sherbert, the
Court "held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with 'a valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." 7

61 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399-401(1963).
621d.at 410.
63
Id.at 406.
64Steven J. Heyman, The Third Annual C. Edwin Baker Lecture for Liberty, Equality, and
Democracy: The Conservative-LibertarianTurn in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,117 W.
VA. L. REv. 231, 257 n. 148 (2014).
65 Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of OR. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
66
Id.at 874.
67 Id.at 879 (quoting UnitedStates v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n. 3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring)).

2016

Stemming the Hobby Lobby Tidal Wave

Three years later, Congress responded to Smith by enacting
RFRA.68 In fact, RFRA was enacted with the explicit purpose of
"restor[ing] the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert" and
"guarantee[ing] its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
' RFRA was successful in doing so as applied to
substantially burdened."69
the federal government, but in City ofBoerne v. Flores the Supreme Court
held that it was unconstitutional as applied to the states.7"
The Court's recent decision in Hobby Lobby demonstrated that
RFRA has teeth as applied in situations where the governmental action is
imposing a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. The holding
has already made ripples. Peter S. Dickinson, a partner at the prominent law
firm Bush Gottlieb in Los Angeles, said at the November 2014 ACA update
session of the American Bar Association's Labor and Employment Law
Conference, "I really do think we will be dealing with the implications [of
the decision] for years and years to come."71 Indeed, the decision has
spurred a movement of litigants testing just how far the religious freedom
argument can go under RFRA, with several attempted expansions finding
success in the courts.72
For example, in Perez v. ParagonContractors,Corp., the Central
Division for the United States District Court of Utah expanded the scope of
RFRA in holding that a member of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints (FLDS) was not required to provide information
to the federal government regarding allegations of child labor used by the
Church.7 3 The court's holding was based on its finding that to require the
FLDS member to provide this information would burden his sincerely held
religious belief not to disclose internal church matters.74
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in Davilav.
Gladden that a prisoner's religious beliefs were "substantially burdened"
when the government denied him access to the Ache-infused 75 beads and

68 Burwell, 134 S.Ct. at 2760.
69 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2015).
70City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
71David McAfee, Hobby Lobby May Spur FurtherChallenges To Preventive Services Rules,

Speaker Says, 41 PENs. & BEN. REP.(BNA) No. 45 2358, 2358 (2014).
72 See Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198, 1207 (11th Cir. 2015); Perez v. Paragon
Contractors, Corp., No. 2:13CV00281-DS, 2014 WL 4628572, at *4 (D. Utah Sept. 11,
2014).
7'Perez, 2014 WL 4628572, at *1,4.
74 Id. at *4.

75 "Ache" is a spiritual force in Mr. Davila's religion of Santeria that is "infused into the
beads and shells during [a] ceremony" that involves "soaking the beads and shells in animal
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shells that his religious beliefs required him to wear.76 The Court held that
this substantial burden triggered the requirement under RFRA for the
government to show a compelling interest.77
The Davila court explicitly noted the impact of the Hobby Lobby
decision on its ruling. It explained that although its holding may have been
inconsistent with an unpublished 2005 case involving similar facts, that
case was "decided well before the Supreme Court's Hobby Lobby
decision."78 In addition, the Supreme Court recently decided a case very
factually similar to Davila called Holt v. Hobbs, which dealt with RFRA's
sister statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA).79 The Court held in Holt that the Arkansas Department of
Correction's "grooming policy" was a violation of RLUIPA because it
prevented the "petitioner from growing a [half-inch] beard in accordance
with his religious beliefs.""
These cases demonstrate the ripple effect of Hobby Lobby and the
expansion of religious litigants' use of RFRA as a sword against the
government. However, these cases simultaneously demonstrate the
limitations of using RFRA as a tool for challenging President Obama's
recent executive order. This is because the "substantial burdens" recognized
in these cases are very different in nature from the consequences that the
President's order has on faith-based organizations that may wish to contract
with the federal government.
The burdens in the cases just discussed include government actions
that directly prevent believers from engaging in the ritual practices of their
religion as well as government actions aiming to compel behavior that is a
direct violation of a person's religious beliefs. In contrast, Executive Order
13672 merely requires companies who choose to contract with the federal
government to not discriminate based on an employee's sexual orientation
or gender identity. If a company does not wish to comply with those
requirements, it will miss out on the benefit of being able to bid on federal
contracts. However, the company will not be penalized in any way.
Indeed, the history leading up to the enactment of RFRA
demonstrates that its primary concern was with laws that inflicted some sort
of punishment or penalty on someone as a result of them acting in
accordance with their religious beliefs. It is significant, therefore, that one
blood, and then rinsing them in an 'elixir' containing dozens of plants and minerals." Davila,
777 F.3d at 1202.
76 Id. at 1205.
77 Id. at 1207.
78
ld. at 1208 n. 4.
79 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015).
80 Id. at 867.
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difference between President Obama's executive order and the Affordable
Care Act is that the ACA imposed a serious financial penalty on those
private employers who failed to comply with the Act's requirements.8 1 The
Act mandated that any covered employer who did not comply with the
ACA's group-health-plan requirements must "pay $100 per day for each
affected individual."82 In addition, if an employer decided "to stop
providing health insurance altogether and at least one full-time employee
enroll[ed] in a health plan and qualifie[d] for a subsidy on one of the
government-run ACA exchanges," the Act required the employer to pay
$2,000 per year for each full-time employee.83 The Supreme Court viewed
these economic consequences for non-compliance as "severe,"" and
ultimately held that the economic penalty constituted a substantial burden
on the plaintiffs' religious beliefs under RFRA, triggering a strict scrutiny
analysis."
President Obama's order, on the other hand, inflicts no such
penalty. In addition, no organization or business is required to contract with
the government, and therefore, any organization can avoid having to
comply with the order's discrimination prohibitions by simply deciding not
to bid on a federal contract. In other words, the order could be construed as
limiting access to a beneficial economic opportunity to organizations that,
for religious reasons, continue discriminating against LGBT employees.
However, the order does not inflict any sort of penalization that could be
considered a "substantial burden."
Challengers might counter-argue based on the "unconstitutional
conditions" doctrine. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is the
principle that the government cannot condition a benefit on the requirement
that recipients forgo constitutionally protected speech, or another
constitutional right.86 This doctrine was articulated by the Supreme Court in
Perry v. Sindermann,which held "that even though a person has no 'right'
to a valuable governmental benefit," the government "may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected

" See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
82
Id.at 2762 (internal quotations omitted).
83 Id.
84

Id.at 2775.
85 Id. at 2779 ("Because the contraceptive mandate forces them to pay an enormous sum of
money-as much as $475 million per year in the case of Hobby Lobby-if they insist on
providing insurance coverage in accordance with their religious beliefs, the mandate clearly
imposes a substantial burden on those beliefs.").
86
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 980 (3d ed. 2006).
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interests--especially, his interest in freedom of speech. ' 87 Therefore,
challengers to Executive Order 13672 could try to claim that the order still
imposes a substantial burden on religious federal contractors because it
conditions a benefit (the ability to contract with the federal government) on
the requirement that the contractor forgo his or her free exercise right to
discriminate against LGBT employees.
However, the best response to this argument would be to point out
the limited scope of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The Supreme
Court qualified the doctrine in cases like Rust v. Sullivan and Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Washington.88 In Regan, the Court
considered whether it was an unconstitutional condition for the IRS to
require non-profit groups not to engage in "substantial lobbying" in order to
receive the benefit of 501(c)(3) tax-deduction privileges.89 It rejected the
non-profit group's contention that the prohibition counted as an
unconstitutional condition and held that Congress could reasonably refuse
to subsidize the lobbying activities of these organizations.9" More
specifically, the Court "reject[ed] the notion that First Amendment rights
9
are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State." '
Similarly, in Rust, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations that
prohibited the use of Title X funds spent by the U.S. government for
promoting family planning from being used in programs where abortion
was a method of family planning. 92 The Court held that requiring Title X
grantees to "engage in abortion-related activity separately from" receiving
federal funding does not deny them the right to engage in those activities
but merely is Congress permissibly "refus[ing] to fund such activities out of
the public fisc." 3 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the "refusal to
fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the
imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity."9' 4

87 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). See also Rosenberger v. Rector &

Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
533 (2001).
88 See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
89 Regan, 461 U.S. at 541-42.
90Id. at 545-46.
"' Id. at 546 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
92 Rust, 500 U.S. at 177-78.
93 Id. at 198.
94

Id. at 193 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n. 19 (1980)).
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Applying the holdings in Rust and Regan to President Obama's
executive order prohibiting federal contractors from discriminating against
LGBT employees reveals why the order cannot be characterized as
imposing an "unconstitutional condition" on religious federal contractors.
The order merely refuses to subsidize discriminatory employment practices
against LGBT people, which under Regan's holding does not appear to
constitute an infringement upon the employer's Free Exercise rights.
According to Rust, it is legitimate for the government to refuse to use public
money to fund certain activities, such as discrimination.
It is also difficult to imagine how being required to give fair
employment opportunities to LGBT people could substantially burden
someone's religious beliefs. Simply having to possibly employ someone
who identifies as a homosexual or who is transgender does not seem to
compel any kind of behavior on the part of the employer that would be
contrary to the employer's religious beliefs. The only possible "burden"
that could be raised by such a scenario might be that the employer would
have to pay family benefits to an LGBT employee in a same-sex
relationship. This is because "Title VII and Supreme Court precedent
require employers to make available the same benefits for spouses
regardless of' an employee's gender.9" Therefore, "OFCCP enforcement of
the new Rule's nondiscrimination prohibitions would bring within
OFCCP's purview the provision of [employee] benefits to an employee's
same-sex spouse. ' 9 6 Contractor employers who oppose same sex marriage
for religious reasons, then, might raise the complaint that they are being
forced to participate in or facilitate an activity that goes against their
religious beliefs.
This argument would be analogous to the argument raised by the
plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby, which was that the ACA forced them to fund the
use of abortifacient drugs. 97 However, the relationship between paying for
an LGBT employee's family benefits and the violation of certain religious
beliefs seems much more tenuous than the relationship between funding an
employee's contraceptives and the violation of certain religious beliefs.
This is because in the instance of abortifacient contraceptives, the employee
is directly funding the very thing that they consider to be blasphemous drugs that can inhibit an already fertilized egg from attaching to the uterus,
thereby preventing its development.98 In the context of paying for family
benefits, however, the payments are not directly funding homosexual sex or

" Hall, supra note 3 1,at 2.
96Id.

97 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
98 Id. at 2762-63.
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any other specific activity that is a religious violation. Furthermore, the
executive order does not "force" any organization or business to do
anything, since they can easily avoid the reach of its prohibitions by
choosing not to contract with the federal government.
One other important distinction between the religious burden at issue in
Hobby Lobby and the potential one implicated by Executive Order 13672 is
that Hobby Lobby dealt with access to abortion and contraception, while
Executive Order 13672 deals with LGBT civil rights. The courts have in
recent history treated these two issues very differently.9 9 As will be
discussed further in the following section, courts have been increasingly
sympathetic toward expanding LGBT rights over the past couple of years.
This trend stands in stark contrast to the way courts have increasingly
placed ever-greater limits on access to abortions. Indeed, many of the
abortion-related decisions by the Supreme Court shortly preceding Hobby
Lobby were in favor of the "pro-life" litigant."1° Hobby Lobby's holding,
then, was consistent with the Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding
women's rights to contraception and abortion. However, it seems likely that
the courts would be more sympathetic to a religious freedom argument
challenging compelled support of abortifacient contraception than a similar
argument challenging compelled support of equal treatment for LGBT
people. The reasons why the courts should evaluate the government's
interest in preventing discrimination against LGBT people as compelling
under RFRA are laid out in the following section.
B. Even if CourtsHold That Executive Order13672 Does Createa
SubstantialBurden, the Government Will Be Able to Show A
Compelling Interest
Even if the courts do determine that Executive Order 13672 creates
a substantial burden under RFRA, it will still prevail under the RFRA
analysis because the government will be able to show a compelling interest
in preventing discrimination against LGBT employees by federal
contractors. Importantly, it is not necessary for the courts to determine that
See Jay Michaelson, Ten Reasons Women Are Losing While Gays Keep Winning, THE
DALLY
BEAST
(July
6,
2014,
7:06
AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2014/07/06/ten-reason-women-are-losing-while-gays-keep-winning.html (explaining
how the Supreme Court's Hobby Lobby decision "is yet another entry in the latest disturbing
trend of civil rights cases, in which gays win, and women lose").
100 For example, the Court held in Gonzales v. Carhartthat Congress's ban on partial-birth
abortion was not unconstitutionally vague and did not impose an undue burden on the right
to an abortion. 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007). In Mazurek v. Armstrong, the Court upheld a
Montana law requiring abortions to be done by licensed physicians. 520 U.S. 968, 969-70,
976 (1997).
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LGBT people constitute a "suspect class" triggering strict scrutiny analysis
under the Fourteenth Amendment for the government's interest in
promoting non-discrimination against LGBT people to be considered
"compelling." The two assessments are distinct. That is because even under
strict scrutiny analysis, a non-constitutional interest can still be considered a
compelling government interest. 01
For example, the Supreme Court held in Planned Parenthoodof
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that a state's interest in fetal life is
important enough to allow it to prohibit abortion after viability, 0 2 "despite
the fact[] that abortion is a constitutional right and that protecting fetal life
is not" a recognized constitutional interest. 10 3 More recently, the Court held
in Holder v. HumanitarianLaw Project that the government's interest in
preventing terrorism survived First Amendment scrutiny. 0 4 It held this nonconstitutional interest to be compelling enough to survive First Amendment
scrutiny even though the Court agreed with the plaintiffs that the statute at
issue regulated speech on the basis of content and therefore, required a
more demanding standard than intermediate scrutiny.'0 5 These are just a
few examples of how strict scrutiny allows for "constitutional rights to be
limited to achieve subconstitutional goals.""
In this case, Executive Order 13672 expresses that the executive
branch has identified equality in the workplace to be a compelling interest.
Even though the judicial branch has not yet decided that strict scrutiny
applies to sexual orientation discrimination, it does not mean that other
branches cannot decide that prohibiting discrimination against LGBT
people is an important and fundamental government interest.
Alternatively, it is arguable that the government interest could be
considered compelling in this case because the courts have been applying
an ever-higher standard of review for sexual orientation discrimination. A
relevant case study for predicting how the courts might interpret a challenge
against government action prohibiting discrimination at the expense of the
101 Mark D. Rosen, When Are ConstitutionalRights Non-Absolute? McCutcheon, Conflicts,
and the Sufficiency Question, 56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1535, 1538 (2015).
102 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (holding that "subsequent to
viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion").
103 Rosen, supra note 101, at 1538.

104 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1,8 (2010) (upholding a federal statute
"prohibit[ing] the provision of material support or resources to certain foreign organizations
that engage in terrorist activity[,]" despite plaintiffs' claim that the statute infringes their
rights to freedom of speech and association).
105 See id.
at 27-29.
106Rosen, supranote 101, at 1538.
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sincerely held religious beliefs is Bob Jones University v. United States. 107
Bob Jones University is a school in South Carolina dedicated to
"fundamentalist Christian religious beliefs,"' ' which at one time had
prohibitions against "interracial dating and marriage."109 The school's
disciplinary rules held that students who were "partners in an interracial
marriage" or who "date [d] outside of their own race" would be expelled."1 0
In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) changed its policies in order to
stop providing tax-exempt status to private schools engaged in racial
discrimination.111 When the IRS revoked Bob Jones University's taxexempt status due to the school's racially discriminatory policies, the
university claimed that the IRS had abridged its religious liberty.112 The
Court ultimately held that the government's "interest in eradicating racial
discrimination in education" overrode "whatever burden denial of tax
benefits place[d] on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs."113
Although Bob Jones University was decided before RFRA was
passed, the outcome would likely have been the same even after RFRA's
passage because the Court found the government interest in eradicating
discrimination to be "compelling" due to the history of racial discrimination
4
in the country."
Although LGBT discrimination has not reached the same standard
of scrutiny as racial discrimination under the Equal Protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the courts have recently evaluated it under
increasingly heightened scrutiny. For example, in 2000, the Supreme Court
did not use any equal protection language in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
where it held that New Jersey's law requiring the Boy Scouts to admit an
openly gay man as an assistant scoutmaster violated the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment right of expressive association. 5 Since then, state and federal
courts have largely adopted an equal protection analysis when it comes to
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Just three years after Boy
Scouts of America, the Supreme Court held in Lawrence v. Texas that a
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage

107 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 612 (1983).
108 Id.at 579-80.
'09
Id. at 580.
0

Id.at 580-81.
...
Id. at 581.
112 Id.at 602-03.
113
Id. at 604.
114 Id.
115 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644-45 (2000).
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in certain intimate sexual conduct violated the Due Process Clause. 16 In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor added that "[m]oral disapproval of
this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause."117
The First Circuit was the first federal appeals court to apply a new
kind of heightened scrutiny, which has been called "rational basis with
bite," ' to sexual orientation discrimination in Massachusetts v. US.
Department of Health & Human Services.119 The court held that Section 3
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which denied federal economic
and other benefits to lawfully married same-sex spouses and to surviving
spouses from such couples, violated the Equal Protection Clause.,2 ° The
court determined that "without insisting on 'compelling' or 'important'
justifications or 'narrow tailoring,' the [Supreme] Court would scrutinize
1 21
with care the purported bases for the legislation."
Then, in the summer of 2013, the Supreme Court in United States
122
v. Windsor struck Section 3 of DOMA from the United States Code.
"[T]he Court cited DOMA's legislative history as evidence that its 'purpose
[wa]s to impose inequality' on gays and lesbians., 123 "[T]he Court [then]
concluded that Congress's stated 'interest in protecting the traditional moral
teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws ' 24 was just another
way of expressing disapproval of homosexuality and thus, failed to comport
with equal protection."' 125 Most recently, the Court held in Obergefell that
"under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of' the right to
126
marry.
116 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
117 Id. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118 Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudenceof Gay Rights,
100 VA. L. REV. 817, 872 (2014) (explaining that some have interpreted the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Windsor to have applied intermediate scrutiny, while
others have concluded that the Court used a heightened form of rational basis review
"known colloquially as rational basis with bite").
119
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012).
20

1 Id. at8, 15.

121 Id. at 11.
122 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
123 Franklin, supra note 118, at 868 (citing Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694).
124 Id. (citing Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693).
125 Id.

126Obergefell, 135

S. Ct. at 2604.
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In addition, state courts have increasingly applied a heightened
scrutiny to discrimination based on sexual orientation, finding justification
in a long history of discrimination against homosexuals. For example, in the
In re Marriage Cases, the Supreme Court of California determined that
government classifications based on sexual orientation, including marriage
restrictions, should be subject to strict scrutiny because sexual orientation
"represents-like gender, race, and religion-a constitutionally suspect
basis upon which to impose differential treatment," and because the
discrimination in the context of marriage restrictions "impinges upon a
same-sex couple's fundamental interest in having their family relationship
accorded the same respect and dignity enjoyed by an opposite-sex
couple."' 27 More specifically, the California Supreme Court held
that the most important factors in deciding whether a
characteristic should be considered a constitutionally
suspect basis for classification are whether the class of
persons who exhibit a certain characteristic historically has
been subjected to invidious and prejudicial treatment, and
whether society now recognizes that the characteristic in
question generally bears no relationship to the individual's
ability to perform or contribute to society.' 28
Even the Montana and Alaska Supreme Courts have recently held that
unequal health insurance coverage for same-sex and different-sex partners
of employees is indefensible, for being "an unjustifiable sexual orientation
classification" and for "violat[ing] the state constitution's equal protection
129
clause[,]" respectively.
It is clear, then, that courts have increasingly considered LGBT
people as a suspect class for the sake of equal protection analysis, deserving
of something more than just a rational basis review when discrimination is
concerned. This trend towards applying an ever-greater level of scrutiny to
LGBT discrimination makes it increasingly likely that the government will
be deemed to have a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination
against LGBT people in the workforce, whether that interest is
constitutional or non-constitutional.

127 In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 401.
128

Id. at 443.
129 Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence ofPersistentand Pervasive WorlqilaceDiscrimination
Against LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation ProhibitingDiscriminationand
Providingfor EqualEmployment Benefits, 45 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 715, 770 (2012).
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CONCLUSION

Presidents have used their executive power to advance civil rights
in America for much of this nation's history13 ° For example, President
Harry S. Truman used an executive order to end racial segregation in the
U.S. military even before the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board
of Education in 1954 and before Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1964.' And Truman's executive order actually expanded upon an earlier
executive order signed by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, which
prohibited "racial discrimination in the defense industry."13' 2 This is just one
example of how presidents have previously "nudged the federal
government closer towards the goal" of equality during a political climate
that made it "extremely difficult to move.., civil rights legislation through
the Congress."' 33
Previous executive action has nudged the federal government
towards increased equal treatment of LGBT people. For example, starting
in 1975, it was executive branch action that "began to protect gay men and
lesbians from discrimination."' 34 Then, subsequent administrations largely
left LGBT executive protections alone, despite having the ability to revoke
them. "Because these executive orders and other executive branch actions
were left 'on the books,' succeeding sympathetic administrations used them
as a foundation for further
executive branch actions to expand the rights of
'13 5
LGBT individuals."
By design, the executive branch has limited power to change
policies or to make sweeping changes to the country's laws. The federal
system's separation of powers is designed to prevent such far-reaching
executive powers. That is the primary reason why challenges brought
against Executive Order 13672 under RFRA are likely to fail--the reach of
the President's order is so limited that it would be difficult for challengers
to even establish a "substantial burden" on their religious freedoms
necessary to make a RFRA claim. However, would-be challengers are
correct to be nervous about what this action could foretell about the future
of LGBT rights expansion in the country, if history is any indicator.

130 Nosanchuk, supra note 18, at 441.
131 Id.See also Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948).
132 Nosanchuk, supra note 18, at 441. See also Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109
(June 25, 1941).
133Nosanchuk, supra note 18, at 441.
13 4

Id. at 442.
135 Id. at 447.

